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Abstract 
This paper investigates the long-run relationship between the entrepreneurial activity, tax evasion and corruption in 15 European 
countries. We posit that tax evasion and corruption have a negative influence on entrepreneurship, but some endogeneity issues 
appear when investigating this relationship. Therefore, we use a panel cointegration analysis and we find that there is a long-run 
link between our variables, and that tax evasion and corruption negatively affect the total entrepreneurial activity. In addition, this 
paper shows that the impact is smaller if we consider the necessity-driven entrepreneurs only, due to the fact that this category of 
entrepreneurs is forced to start a business having no other revenue sources and is less sensitive to institutional weaknesses. More 
precisely, while corruption still influences the activity of necessity-driven entrepreneurs, no effect is documented in the case of 
tax evasion. This result proves that necessity-driven entrepreneurs do not carefully take into account the external traits when they 
start a business. Consequently, if the entrepreneurship is associated with one of the main drivers of economic growth, the 
authorities shall handle the institutional weaknesses in order to favor the entrepreneurial activity. 
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1. Introduction  
Entrepreneurship is considered one of the main ingredients of economic growth, fostering the productivity level, 
enhancing the employment and leading to other potential efficiency gains through the tax system (Cullen & Gordon, 
2007). In this context, the impact of taxation on the entrepreneurial activity is heavily investigated. However, less 
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attention is paid to the long-run impact of tax evasion and corruption level on the entrepreneurial activity. Several 
scholars indicate that corruption has a significant negative impact on the levels of tax revenues collected in a country 
(Nawaz, 2010), and that it is inter-linked with the tax evasion, but, as far as we know, there is no research 
investigating their joint impact on entrepreneurship.  
This paper fills in this gap and analyzes the complexity of the relationship between corruption, tax evasion and 
the entrepreneurial activity in Europe. The fact that countries with higher levels of corruption also tend to have larger 
shadow economies, which generate tax evasion, is commonly accepted. At the same time, the presence of tax 
evasion nourishes the corruption environment, especially in the case of tax administrators. Both phenomena have a 
negative impact on entrepreneurship and economic growth, discouraging the initiative of the private sector and 
enhancing the uncertainty on the market.  
Although a large body of works have addressed how different institutional weaknesses influence the 
entrepreneurial activity, less attention was paid to tax evasion and corruption, with few exceptions. For example, 
Estrin & Mickiewicz (2012) consider that in countries with larger shadow economies individuals are more or less 
likely to initiate entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, Parker (2003) shows that tax evasion influences the 
occupational choice and the entrepreneurial activity. Anokhin & Schulze (2009) posit in their turn that better control 
of corruption might be associated with rising levels of entrepreneurship.  
However, neither of these papers considers the endogeneity problems associated with the fact that entrepreneurs 
can also influence the level of tax evasion and corruption. On the one hand, entrepreneurs can obtain advantages 
from illegal trading, generating then tax evasion (Fadahunsi & Rosa, 2002). So, several papers show that 
entrepreneurs pay taxes only when the tax morale is high, when the tax evasion is costly, and when the risks of being 
caught and the severity of punishment are also high (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Lisi &Pugno, 2011; Mickiewicz, 
Rebmann & Sauka,  2012). But this conclusion is too simplistic, because the mechanism of entrepreneurs generating 
tax evasion is complex. On the other hand, if we assume that entrepreneurs can play a role in tax evasion, they also 
might be engaged in small corruption practices. Therefore, the current study attempts to fill in the void existing in 
the literature by exploiting the long-run interdependencies which exists between these phenomena.  
Our study brings forward three contributions to the canon of work on the subject. First, the study here analyzes 
the long-term relationship between institutional weaknesses, associated with tax evasion and corruption, and the 
entrepreneurial activity in 15 European countries, over the time-span 2002-1010, using Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) data for entrepreneurship, Transparency International data for corruption and the statistics proposed 
by Schneider & Buehn (2012) for measuring tax evasion.  
Second, it addresses the long-run relationship within a cointegration framework and takes into account the 
potential endogeneity of the involved variables by using adequate models as the fully modified OLS estimator 
(FMOLS) and the dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator. In particular, we use the cointegration analysis for 
heterogeneous panels, as proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2001), and we compare the results with the cointegration 
techniques conceived for homogenous panels, advanced by Kao (1999). However, given the structure of our sample 
the probability to have homogenous panels is reduced. Therefore, the results’ interpretation is largely based on the 
Pedroni’s technique. The long-term regression is carried out using the FMOLS and DOLS estimators.  
Another important consideration is the distinction between different types of entrepreneurs. The GEM statistics 
allows to differentiate between necessity-driven entrepreneurs (NDE) and innovation-driven entrepreneurs (IDE). 
Consequently, because the NDE are forced to engage themselves in entrepreneurial activities having no other source 
of revenues, the impact of corruption and tax evasion on NDE is expected to be smaller than the impact on the total 
entrepreneurial activity (TEA), which includes both the NDE and IDE. 
To anticipate the primary results, we find that entrepreneurship, tax evasion and corruption are cointegrated. 
Furthermore, we discover that the level of corruption and tax evasion negatively impact the total entrepreneurial 
activity in Europe, in the long-run. In addition, tax evasion has no impact on NDE while the corruption level 
negatively affects the activity of this category of entrepreneurs.  
This paper continues as follows. The second section shortly reviews the literature and presents the research 
hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology. Section 4 describes the data and presents the results. The 
last section concludes. 
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2. Literature and research hypotheses 
In this section we briefly discuss the theoretical relationship between entrepreneurship, tax evasion and 
corruption. We start the discussion with the evident correlation which exists between tax evasion and corruption. 
Several studies show that corruption affects tax administration and has a negative impact on the levels of tax 
revenues collected in a country (Nawaz, 2010). The corruption can manifest under divers forms as bribery, revenue 
fraud, embezzlement, extortion, patronage/nepotism, regulatory capture, collusion between tax officers and tax 
payers, political interference, revolving doors (for details see Martini, 2014), and it is seen by some scholars as a tool 
to mitigate the burdens of excessive taxation on the economy through enabling better allocation of resources and 
enabling investment. However, the dominant view clearly states that both phenomena are negative for the economy 
in general, and for the entrepreneurial activity in particular. 
Even if the link between tax evasion and entrepreneurship is rarely addressed in the literature, the impact of taxes 
on the entrepreneurial activity is heavily investigated. Taxation can affect the entrepreneurial entry in different ways, 
trough the level of investment, risk taking, and trough the occupational choice (Bruce & Gurley, 2004; Asoni & 
Sanandaji, 2014). Stenkula (2012) identifies three channels which link taxation and entrepreneurship, underlined by 
the theoretical literature, namely the incentive effect affecting the effort of self-employed people, the evasion effect 
affecting the willingness to become self-employed and to take advantage of the opportunities to decrease the tax 
burden, and the insurance effect associated with risk taking. Therefore, considerable empirical work has been done 
to analyze the relationship between taxes and entrepreneurship (for a review of the literature, see Bruce & Schuetze, 
2004). In this line, a series of papers examines the impact of income and payroll taxes on the decision to became 
entrepreneurs (Bruce, 2000; Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2002; Cullen & Gordon, 2007; Henrekson, Johansson & 
Stenkula, 2010), while other papers investigate the role of tax progressivity (Robson & Wren, 1999; Folster, 2002). 
For example, Da Rin, Di Giacomo & Sembenelli (2011) investigate how tax policy fosters the creation of new 
companies, using a country-industry level panel database for 17 European countries between 1997 and 2004. They 
find a significant negative effect of corporate income taxation on entry rates. Ferede (2013) emphasizes the fact that 
the adverse impact of income taxes on the entrepreneurial risk-taking outweighs the tax evasion opportunities for the 
self-employed persons. In their treatment of the relationship between tax structure and entrepreneurship, 
Baliamoune-Lutz & Garello (2014) use GEM data on nascent entrepreneurship and Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Tax Database. Their panel data analysis shows that tax progressivity at higher-
than-average incomes has a robust negative effect on nascent entrepreneurship. 
Another strand of literature investigates the entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards tax evasion (for a review of the 
literature see Mickiewicz, Rebmann & Sauka, 2012). The key word here is “tax morale”, seen as a moral obligation 
or an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, and most of the papers (i.e. Yitzhaki, 1974) highlight the role of the risks of 
being caught and the severity of punishment for the entrepreneurs’ behavior regarding tax avoidance.  
Unlike tax evasion, tax morale does not measure the individual behavior, but rather the individual attitude (Lisi & 
Pugno, 2011). Therefore, more recent, the entrepreneurship cognition literature emphasizes the role of owner-
manager attitudes and intentions in shaping their behavior and business strategies, but also the social norms agreed 
by entrepreneurs (Wikilund, Davidsson & Delmar, 2003; Mickiewicz, Rebmann & Sauka, 2012). Thus, the effect of 
entrepreneurship on the level of tax evasion is noteworthy and shall be considered in this category of analyses.  
The link between corruption and entrepreneurship is also investigated by the literature. Anokhin & Schulze 
(2009) suggest that corruption and the institutions’ quality play an important role in accounting for disparities in 
rates of entrepreneurship and innovation across nations. If corruption is present, decisions for entrepreneurs became 
risky. If the opposite applies, corruption seems to disappear from the entrepreneur’s calculations, communication 
channels are efficient, and the market mechanism reduces the costs (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). In a far more recent 
paper, Dove (2015) shows that the judicial independence, associated with the fight against corruption, is important 
for the entrepreneurial activity. 
At the same time, entrepreneurs are not totally unfamiliar with corruption practices. In this light, Fadahunsi & 
Rosa (2002) underline the entrepreneurial advantages of trading in illegal goods in Nigeria. They state that, although 
there has been some research into illegal business activity, the literature focused on large organizations. However, in 
their opinion, an entrepreneur is a “person sailing close to the wind, constantly testing the boundaries of what is 
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permissible, bending the rules, and exploiting any ambiguity in the law”. Therefore, the link between 
entrepreneurship and corruption is not unidirectional.  
In this regard, we consider that tax evasion and corruption range between the elements with a negative influence 
on the entrepreneurial activity. At the same time, some reverse causality issues appear, the entrepreneurs having in 
their turn an influence on the level of tax evasion and corruption. We posit then that there is a long-run relationship 
between these variables. Consequently: 
H1: Entrepreneurship, tax evasion and corruption are cointegrated 
However, the contribution of entrepreneurs to tax evasion and corruption is intuitive and can hardly be 
demonstrated. Thus, our interest variable is the total entrepreneurial activity, while tax evasion and corruption are 
regarded as explanatory variables. So, we emphasize that that there is a negative influence of tax evasion and 
corruption on entrepreneurship. 
H2: Tax evasion and corruption negatively impact the entrepreneurial activity in the long-run  
Another important consideration revolves around the distinction between NDE and IDE, allowed by the GEM 
statistics. While IDE notice investment opportunities in the market and have a deeper knowledge of the economic 
environment, NDE are forced to orient themselves toward self-employment because they have no other revenue 
source for living. Consequently, even if the corruption level and tax evasion negatively affect their performances, we 
expect a smaller impact in this case as compared to TEA. Therefore: 
H3: Tax evasion and corruption negatively affect NDE, but the effect is smaller compared with the TEA 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Panel Cointegration Tests 
Pedroni (1999, 2001) proposes several cointegration tests for heterogenous panels, and shows that these tests are 
less restrictive compared to those employed for homogenous panels. The group tests for heterogenous panels are 
based on the between-dimension approach which includes three statistics: group rho-Statistic, group PP-Statistic and 
group ADF-Statistic. The tests for homogenous panels are based on the within-dimension approach (panel statistics) 
which includes four statistics: panel v-Statistic, panel rho-Statistic, panel PP-Statistic, and panel ADF-Statistic. 
These four statistics pool the autoregressive coefficients across different countries for the unit root tests on the 
estimated residual. 
Kao (1999) further studies the special case in which cointegrating vectors are assumed to be homogeneous. In this 
case, the asymptotic equivalency result is violated because of the endogeneity of regressors. In addition, for macro-
panels, it is hard to consider the homogeneity hypothesis. Therefore, different from the Kao’s test constructed for 
strictly homogenous panels, the Pedroni’s tests allow for cross-section interdependence with different individual 
effects and relax the homogeneity assumption. 
For both tests, we have: 
ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߴ௜ǡ௧ 
ݔ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ݔ௜ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ 
We consider the regression: 
ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚ௜ǡ௧ݔ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧          (1) 
where: ݅ ൌ ͳǡǥ ǡ ܰ are the countries in the panel; ݐ ൌ ͳǡǥܶ refers to the analyzed period; ן௜ǡ௧  are  individual 
constant terms; ߚ௜ǡ௧ is the slope parameter (which is considered homogenous in the case of Kao, 1999); ߴ௜ǡ௧, ߝ௜ǡ௧ are 
stationary disturbance terms and therefore, ݕ௜ǡ௧ and ݔ௜ǡ௧ are integrated process of order 1 for all ݅. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration (ߩ௜ ൌ ͳ) is tested applying a unit root test on the residuals, as follows: 
ݑ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߩ௜ݑ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ݓ௜௧           (2) 
For the estimation of the cointegration relationship in our study, we propose a modified version of the Pedroni’s 
cointegration model (which allows for the cointegration of more than two variables), as follows:  
ܶܧܣ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚଵǡ௜ܶܧܸ ൅ ߚଶǡ௜ܥܱܴ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧        (3) 
and 
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ܰܦܧ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚଵǡ௜ܶܧܸ ൅ ߚଶǡ௜ܥܱܴ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧        (4) 
where: ܶܧܣ is the total entrepreneurial activity; ܰܦܧ  are the necessity-driven entrepreneurs;  ܶܧܸ  is the tax 
evasion level; ܥܱܴ is the corruption level and ݑ௜ǡ௧ is the error term. 
3.2. Long-run relationship based on FMOLS and DOLS 
Various estimation methods for panel cointegration models are proposed in the literature. Although the OLS 
estimator is consistent under panel cointegration, it has a second order asymptotic bias. Therefore, the FMOLS and 
the DOLS estimation techniques were designed. After multiple Monte Carlo experiments to compare small sample 
properties of particular forms of panel FMOLS and DOLS estimators, Pedroni (2001) proposes the FMOLS, while 
Kao and Chiang (2000) recommend the dynamic DOLS. For specific versions of within-dimension panel estimators, 
Monte Carlo results illustrate that DOLS has superior small sample properties. However, Pedroni (2001) points out 
that the within-dimension panel FMOLS and DOLS estimators proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000) suffer from 
serious small sample size distortions and their results are difficult to be interpreted from an economically point of 
view when the cointegrating vectors are heterogeneous. Pedroni (2000) shows thus that the group mean panel 
estimator pools the data along the between-dimension and exhibits relatively minor size distortions in small samples. 
So, building up on Kao and Chiang (2000), Pedroni also proposes a between-dimension, group means panel DOLS 
estimator that incorporates corrections for endogeneity and serial correlation parametrically. In this study we present 
both categories of estimations for robustness purpose. 
Consequently, after the documentation of the cointegration relationship, we first estimate the non-parametric 
FMOLS for heterogeneous cointegrated panels, following Pedroni (2000). The model is: 
ܶܧܣ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚଵǡ௜ܶܧܸ ൅ ߛଶǡ௜ܥܱܴ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧        (5) 
ܰܦܧ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚଵǡ௜ܶܧܸ ൅ ߛଶǡ௜ܥܱܴ ൅ ݑ௜ǡ௧        (6) 
Alternatively, the group mean panel DOLS estimator is: 
ܶܧܣ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚଵǡ௜௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ߛଵ௜௞οܶܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൅௞೔௞ୀି௞೔ ߚଶǡ௜ܥܱܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ߛଶ௜௞οܥܱܴ௜௧ ൅
௞೔
௞ୀି௞೔ ݑ௜ǡ௧   (7) ܰܦܧ௜ǡ௧ ൌן௜ǡ௧൅ ߚଵǡ௜ܶܧ ௜ܸǡ௧ ൅ σ ߛଵ௜௞οܶܧ ௜ܸ௧ ൅௞೔௞ୀି௞೔ ߚଶǡ௜ܥܱܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ߛଶ௜௞οܥܱܴ௜௧ ൅
௞೔
௞ୀି௞೔ ݑ௜ǡ௧   (8) 
 
4. Data and results 
4.1. Data 
For the 15 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), the annual data regarding the 
entrepreneurial activity are collected from the GEM database and cover the period 2002-2010. Because the tax 
evasion series provided by Schneider & Buehn (2012) stop in 2010, we are forced to perform the analysis on the 
indicated time-span. The corruption perception index is extracted from the Transparency International database and 
represents one possibility of studying corruption (usually employed in the literature), beside the World Bank’s 
control of corruption index. Notice that a high level of the index is equivalent with a small level of corruption. 
Consequently, the waited sign is positive in the case of ܥܱܴ, which proves a negative influence. 
Before performing the cointegration analysis, we must be sure that our variables are I(1). Thus, a series of panel 
unit root tests are performed (Table 1). Except for the test proposed by Levin, Lin & Chu (2002), all the other tests 
document the presence of unit roots in level, and show that variables are I(1). However, the asymptotic properties of 
all these tests require large N and T. Moreover, all tests are based on the strong assumption of independent cross-
section units, which proves their limits in the case of macro-panels. Nevertheless, Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003) prove 
that their test can be used even if N and T do not converge toward infinity. Given the above considerations, we look 
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Table 1. Panel unit root tests. 
Variables 







TEA -3.537*** -0.817 39.45 68.20*** 
NDE -1.754** -0.593 35.61 59.00*** 
TEV -4.603*** -0.006 24.31 9.228 
COR -5.442*** -1.182 47.58** 37.0 
First 
difference 
ΔTEA -7.035*** -2.679*** 59.64*** 128.6*** 
ΔNDE -7.033*** -2.308** 55.00*** 104.9*** 
ΔTEV -6.210*** -2.065** 46.96** 42.94** 
ΔCOR -6.155*** -1.629* 47.52** 76.14*** 
Notes: (1) *, ** and *** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% , 5% and 10% significance level; (2) Levin, Lin & Chu t* assumes 
common unit root process; (3) Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF–Fisher Chi-square and PP–Fisher Chi-square assume individual unit root 
process; (4) Δ denotes the first difference. 
 
4.2. Results 
  We present two categories of results, one for TEA and one for NDE. We start with the cointegration results and 
afterwards we test the long-run relationship employing the FMOLS and DOLS estimators. 
Table 2 presents the cointegration results. As it can be seen, if we consider the particular case of homogenous 
panels, two out of the four tests proposed by Pedroni (1999, 2001) indicate a cointegration relationship, both for 
TEA and NDE. The Kao’s (1999) test also documents the existence of a cointegration relationship. However, the 
hypothesis of heterogeneous panels is more plausible. In this case, the results also support the existence of 
cointegration (two out of the three tests). Therefore, we admit the long-run relationship between entrepreneurship, 
tax evasion and corruption.  
 
Table 2. Panel cointegration tests. 
 Within-dimension (homogenous) Between-dimension (heterogeneous) 




Panel v-Statistic -0.120 -1.545 Group rho-Statistic  2.183 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.715  0.670 Group PP-Statistic -12.37*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -8.681*** -9.508*** Group ADF-Statistic -6.776*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -5.702*** -5.967***   
Kao (1999) ADF t-Statistic -2.266**    
Δ ui,t t-Statistic -9.503***    
      




Panel v-Statistic  1.444 -1.195 Group rho-Statistic  2.878 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.431  1.012 Group PP-Statistic -6.449*** 
Panel PP-Statistic -3.817*** -5.599*** Group ADF-Statistic -3.634*** 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.719*** -4.300***   
Kao (1999) ADF t-Statistic -2.781***    
Δ ui,t t-Statistic -7.485***    
Notes: (1) *, ** and *** mean statistic relationship significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively; (2) 135 observations; (3) Schwarz information 
criterion for lags selection is used. 
 
The next steps consist in estimating this long-run relationship based on FMOLS and DOLS estimators (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Panel FMOLS and DOLS. 
variables 
TEA NDE 
FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS 
TEV -0.747**  -0.662  4.231  8.169*** 
COR  0.520***  0.514***  0.796***  0.666** 
Notes: (1) *, ** and *** mean statistic relationship significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively; (2) group mean panel estimator for 
heterogeneous panels is used; (3) Schwarz information criterion for lag and lead selection in the case of DOLS is employed. 
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The results presented in Table 3 are intriguing. First, in the case of TEA, we notice that tax evasion has a 
negative influence. The same applies for the corruption (remember, a high level of corruption means a small value 
of the corruption index). However, if we compare the FMOLS and DOLS estimators, the results are not robust 
regarding the impact of tax evasion on entrepreneurship. Second, if we look to NDE, we notice that corruption 
negatively influences their activity, both under FMOLS and DOLS estimations. Nevertheless, in the case of tax 
evasion the results are not robust, and the significance of the coefficient is documented only for the DOLS model. 
Moreover, we notice a positive influence of tax evasion on NDE. This mechanism might occur as an increased tax 
evasion encourages people without occupation to start a business, though their risk perception decreases.   
All in all, our findings confirm our first research hypothesis, namely the cointegration relationship. In addition, if 
we analyze only the FMOLS estimator view its superiority given the structure of our data sample, the second 
hypothesis is also confirmed for TEA, and partially confirmed for NDE. However, our results are not in line with 
our third research hypothesis. On the one hand, the corruption level has a stronger influence on NDE as compared to 
TEA. On the other hand, the tax evasion has no clear influence on their activity. 
  
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper improves upon earlier studies in that it tries to investigate the joint long-run impact of tax evasion and 
corruption on the entrepreneurial activity. Using a panel cointegration framework which takes into consideration the 
existing endogeneity between the variables, we show that there is a long-run relationship between entrepreneurship, 
tax evasion and corruption. Furthermore, we document the negative influence of corruption, both on TEA and NDE. 
However, the results are mixed regarding the influence of tax evasion on entrepreneurship. As such, we show, using 
the FMOLS estimator, that tax evasion negatively affects TEA, while having no impact on NDE, though the latter 
result is somewhat less robust. 
Given the role of the entrepreneurial activity in fostering the economic growth, our findings have several policy 
implications. On the one hand, when trying to reduce tax evasion, authorities shall also fight against corruption. On 
the other hand, in order to promote entrepreneurship, both phenomena shall be eradicated. It appears that corruption 
has a higher negative impact on entrepreneurship than tax evasion. This result is not surprising given the fact that 
entrepreneurs are persons who assume risks and, if they perceive that their competitors obtain advantages from non-
paying taxes, they behave accordingly. Nevertheless, in the case of corruption the situation is somehow different, as 
it appears that entrepreneurs either do not have financial resources to bribe and to obtain this way advantages from a 
corrupt administration, or because they have an adverse perception on corruption, associating it with bureaucracy or 
with uncertainty on the market. 
At the same time, our results reveal some lessons to be learned by entrepreneurs. It appears that their activities 
cannot be developed in the presence of corruption. Therefore, if they pursue short-term objectives by appealing to 
corruption, this phenomenon will have a negative repercussion on their activity in the long-run. Further, if 
entrepreneurs do not pay their taxes, they might benefit in the short-run, but in the long-run, the budgetary deficit 
generated by tax evasion will lead to increased levels of taxation and tightening controls by fiscal administrators. All 
these phenomena will negatively impact their activities. 
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